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Abstract 
It is empirically shown that the more flexible employment, the more it is precarious. For this 
purpose, two families of indices, of flexible work and of precarious work, are defined basing on 
the Fourth European Survey of Working Conditions 2005 by the European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. Two methodologies of constructing composite 
indicators are applied, of the Hans Böckler Foundation, and of the OECD. Both methodologies 
give very similar results. After the indices have been constructed, the dependence between 
flexibility and precariousness of work is established by regression analysis with statistical 
certainty. 
Besides, it is revealed that the institutional regulation of employment does not necessarily imply 
the adequate factual effect. For instance, Turkey and Greece with a strict employment protection 
legislation have a high labour market flexibility due to a large fraction of employees who work 
with no contract. 
Among other things, it is shown that the employment flexibility has the strongest negative effect 
on the employability. It implies serious arguments against the recent reconsideration of the 
function of social security attempted by the European Commission within the flexicurity 
discourse. The suggested shift from income security towards a high employability cannot be 
consistently implemented. Our study provides empirical evidence that a high employability can 
be hardly attained under flexible employment. 
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1.  Introduction  
The European Commission’s (2006) Green Paper: Modernising Labour Law to Meet the 
Challenges of the 21
st Century has put flexicurity on the top of political agenda. This hybrid term 
has become one of the more fashionable elements of the European political discourse when it 
comes to addressing social and economic policies in general and employment policies in 
particular. But still there is no unambiguous understanding of flexicurity, to say nothing of its 
operational definition.  
The term flexicurity was launched in the Netherlands during the preparation of the Dutch 
Flexibility and Security Act which came into force in 1999. The term was rapidly picked up by 
labour market researchers, who discovered Denmark as an alternative to the Dutch flexicurity 
model (WSI 2000). In both countries flexible employment relations are compensated by 
advantages in social security and employment security, so that many scholars describe flexicurity 
as a flexibility–security trade-off (Wilthagen and Tros 2004).  
The Dutch and Danish experience proves that alternative approaches to simple deregulation of 
labour market can be successful in providing high levels of flexibility without attaining it at the 
cost of increased workers insecurity. Hence, flexicurity offers options for a market with a human 
face, fitting European models of capitalism better than pure flexibilization under the deregulatory 
approach of the American model. 
In both countries — Denmark and the Netherlands — flexicurity is regarded as a response to 
challenges of globalisation. On the one hand, enterprises can easily adapt to changing needs and 
requirements. Flexicurity enhances their competitiveness and further economic growth. On the 
other hand, flexicurity contributes to social coherence by achieving a high degree of employment 
security and of social security.  
Under flexicurity, both dimensions of security – employment and social security — are equally 
taken into account. However, the approach of the EC Green Paper on labour law is rather one-
sided, focusing primarily on employment security and turning a blind eye to the second important 
factor — social security, including income security.  
As for flexibilization, the longstanding assumption, that extensive deregulation and flexibilisation 
of labour market would automatically lead to higher levels of production and therefore, 
ultimately, to higher income and better social security, is now put in question. Even the OECD 
retreats from its former radical position. It admits that there is no clear relation between the level 
of employment protection and the level of unemployment. Consequently, deregulation is not a 
universal mean to improve labour market performance.  
The link between employment protection legislation and employment trends is weaker than 
suggested in the neo-classical theory. As recognized in a recent OECD paper (Brandt et al. 2005), 
the deregulation of labour markets in the OECD countries had a little impact on employment. For 
example, German flexibilization reforms in 1994–2004 were accompanied by increasing 
unemployment. In Spain, on the contrary, unemployment significantly decreased without any 
tangible deregulation of the strictly regulated labour market. There is evidence that a high level of 
employment and a low level of unemployment can be attained under different models of labour 
market regulations (Howell et al. 2006; OECD 2006; Baker et al. 2005).    8
These studies also show that flexibility results in a high risk of exacerbating social and income 
inequalities. Indeed, employees with non-standard contracts have disadvantageous income, lower 
employment stability and limited access to company-based professional training (OECD 2002 
and 2006). Besides, deregulation results in segmented labour markets, with some workers 
enjoying a high degree of security and others being trapped in less secure employment with poor 
career prospects.  
All these problems should be solved by flexicurity. It is expected that it will improve the 
employability and mobility of employees, providing stable employment, better access to 
company-based training, and offering opportunities to move into better jobs. 
This paper examines the relationship between flexibility and social security, respectively, 
precariousness of work in 31 European countries. It starts with defining and operationalizing 
flexibility and precariousness. The next step describes the model for processing data which stems 
from The Fourth European Working Conditions Survey 2005 by the European Foundation 
(2007). After that two indices of flexibility and precariousness of work are applied to evaluate 
European countries and to investigate the interdependence between these aspects of work. The 
paper continues with the main findings. It reveals that flexibility and precariousness of work are 
correlated with statistical certainty and that flexibility has a significant negative impact on 
employability. 
2.  Flexibility of work 
Flexibility is regarded as a sine qua non of structural change, economic growth and reduction of 
unemployment (Standing 1999). It covers a broad range of various measures which allow 
companies to adapt to new situations. At the same time, the concept of flexibility often remains 
ill-defined. Neither flexibility types are considered and classified with respect to their different 
functions and their implications for labour market and social security.  
According to segmentation theorists (Döringer/Piore 1971), labour market consists of various 
segments with particular operation rules. To describe the segments, it is appropriate to distinguish 
between several types of flexibility. Another reason for such a distinction is the necessity to deal 
with different constellations of emerging problems, like short-term surges in demand, or seasonal 
and cyclical fluctuations with specific adjustment requirements.  
One of basic flexibility classifications was proposed by the OECD (Atkinson 1984; OECD 1986 
and 1989). It was originally designed for company adaptation strategies and reflected 
requirements of employers rather than that of employees. Our considerations (Keller/Seifert 
2006) extend and modify this pattern to the end of analysing the influence of flexibilisation on 
social security and working conditions. 
The main distinction is made between internal and external flexibility. Internal flexibility covers 
all strategies of deploying the firm's labour to competition needs without resorting to the external 
labour market. This includes, in particular, adjusting working time (internal numerical 
flexibilisation), income (wage flexibilisation), and work organisation (functional flexibilisation). 
By contrast, external flexibility is based above all on ”traditional” ways of adjusting the number 
of employees by recruitments, dismissals, as well as using fixed-term and temporary agency 
employment.    9
                                                
The second distinction is made between numerical, functional, and monetary (wage) flexibility. 
"Numerical" refers to adjustments which can be expressed in some 'labour units': recruitments, 
dismissals, temporary contracts, variability of working time, overtime work, etc. Functional 
flexibility characterizes this scope to adjust tasks, work organisation, etc. Monetary flexibility 
describes the adjustability of wages to the market demand, company performance, and individual 
productivity.  
The types of flexibility interact with each other, e.g. internal numerical and internal functional 
adjustments are simultaneously negotiated in pacts for employment and competitiveness aimed at 
reducing both amount of work and labour costs (Sisson/Artiles 1999; Freyssinet/Seifert 2001; 
Seifert/Massa-Wirth 2005). Alternatively, flexibility forms can substitute one another. For 
example, internal numerical flexibility can replace external numerical flexibility. To adjust labour 
input companies have the option to reduce the number of employees or of their working hours. 
The forms and combinations of flexibility types depend on the national labour market regulation, 
particular management needs, and the company’s cost-benefit balance.  
In spite of the evident importance of the topic discussed, there are surprisingly few works on 
operationalizing and measuring flexibility. The most cited contribution of this kind is the OECD 
(1999 and 2004) evaluation of external numerical flexibility with a composite indicator of 
strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL). The indicator is used for international 
comparisons and for analysis of the influence of labour market regulation on the labour market 
performance.  
The EPL-indicator of the OECD, however, is restricted exclusively to institutional aspects of 
flexibilization (how rigid is the legal framework) and is based on judgements of the OECD 
experts (which can be subjective). It reflects neither the factual situation (how regulation is 
practiced in single countries, its applicability to all labour market segments), nor empirical data 
(how large are the groups with certain types of contract, how many people are protected/not 
protected by the legislation). Besides, it evaluates the protection of permanent and fixed-term 
employment from different viewpoints, so that fixed-term contracts look often much better 
protected than permanent ones.
2 And, moreover, different forms of internal flexibility are not 
considered.  
3.  Social security and precariousness of work 
Pros and cons of flexibilization are disputed mainly at the level of logical arguments and 
normative models rather than at the level of empirical findings. The adherents of liberalization 
assure that social security will benefit from a relaxed employment protection, because it will 
stimulate production and bring additional jobs, higher profits, and, consequently, higher tax 
payments to the state budget. The adherents of the European welfare model fear that flexibility 
can destabilise employment, deteriorate working conditions, reduce wage level and tax liability 
of the population, and increase inequality and social tension. 
The major issue of the flexicurity debate is the impact of flexibilization on employment regarded 
from the viewpoint of social security. The first step to operationalise the problem is specifying 
 
2 EPL-scores of temporary employment are higher than that of temporary employment for Belgium (1.7 and  2.6, 
respectively), France (2.5 and 3.6), Greece (2.4 and 3.3), Italy (1.8 and 2.1), Norway (2.3 and 2.9), Spain (2.6 and 
3.5), and Turkey (2.6 and 4.9); see OECD (2004: 117).    10
the quality of employment by appropriate criteria, similarly as flexibility is specified by different 
dimensions. One way of doing it is characterizing employment in terms of precarious–decent 
work (ILO 1999). Keller and Seifert (2006) suggest four criteria:  
Income. The level of income should be sufficient for subsistence. The usual reference is the low-
wage threshold set at two thirds of the median wage level of the full-time employed.  
Employment stability. It is understood in the sense of employment with a minimum of 
interruptions. This is a prerequisite for independent income and eligibility for social security 
benefits. Here, employment stability is understood with respect to labour market in general rather 
than with respect to the current job.  
Employability. It is understood as the capacity to be employed and is therefore a prerequisite for 
employment stability. The importance of employability increases because of rapid structural 
change with corresponding requirements to qualification and functional adaptability. 
Employability can be secured through lifelong learning.  
Integration in social security system. This criterion embraces pension funds, unemployment 
insurance, and health insurance. Due to the lack of available data this criterion is not considered 
in the model. 
It is suspected that different flexibility forms influence the precariousness forms in different 
ways. Thus external numerical flexibility affects above all employment stability. Indeed, a loss of 
a job is usually followed by a career interruption and a certain drawback in re-employment 
conditions, — although it is conceivable that even a non-benevolent career break finally ends in a 
better employment situation. Besides, external flexibility includes atypical employment (fixed-
term contracts, temporary agency work) with its relative low wages, low employment stability 
and poor access to company-based training (OECD 2002 and 2006).  
By contrast, employment stability should be higher under internal numerical flexibility, because 
it does not concern dismissals or using atypical employment but is restricted to working time 
arrangements and internal restructurings. Working time flexibility is inherent in European 
countries at different degrees. The differences depend on national governmental regulations 
(European Commission 2001). 
Internal numerical flexibility must have no negative impact on employability. Indeed, since the 
employees work in the company for a long time, both the employees and the company are 
motivated to improve professional skills. This hypothesis follows considerations of the theory of 
human capital.  
Internal numerical flexibility is likely linked to internal functional flexibility, because workers 
often switch not only between working time options but also between different tasks within the 
company. For example, when Volkswagen company reduced the weekly working hours by 20% 
to 28.8 hours to avoid dismissals in the early 1990s, it was necessary to move employees from 
one department to another to equalize the different degree of capacity utilisation between 
departments. Respectively, the employees were charged with new tasks (Promberger et al. 1996). 
Besides, internal numerical flexibility with different schedules of working time can cause wage 
flexibility dependent on duration and location of working hours.  
Thus, the criteria of flexibility and precariousness of work can be implemented in partial and 
aggregate indicators with which the above formulated hypothesis can be empirically tested.  4.  Indices of flexibility and social security 
Our goal is to construct indices of flexibility and precariousness of work and to analyse their 
interdependence. The empirical data are taken from the Fourth European Working Conditions 
Survey of the European Foundation (2007) which is based on a questionnaire on various aspects 
of working conditions. In the Survey, 29860 persons from 31 European countries (EU-25 and 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Turkey, Norway, and Switzerland) are interviewed. Each country is 
represented by ca. 1000 interviews, except for Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, Luxembourg, and 
Slovenia with about 600 interviews each. After having excluded all non-employees (trainees, 
self-employed, and unemployed), the number of persons considered is reduced to 23788.  
The data structure for the model can be imagined as a large table, where each row consists of 
answers of an individual to selected 42 questions: 29 on flexibility (5 groups by types of 
flexibility), and 13 on precariousness of work (3 groups); see the Annex for the full list of 
variables and their groups. Each column with 23788 coded answers to the given question is 
regarded as a variable. All variables are recoded to respect the rule: the higher the value, the more 
flexible (precarious) is work; for details see Tangian (2005, 2006, and 2007a –b). 
The next step is scaling re-coded variables. We apply two ways of scaling, normalization, which 
is inherent in the methodology of the Hans-Böckler Foundation (HBS), and standardization, 
which is inherent in the methodology of the OECD and Joint Research Center of the European 
Communities (JRC).  
  11
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Under normalization (HBS method), the variable's min and max are reduced to 0 and 1, 
respectively. Optionally, the variable is expressed in % of its range. For this purpose, every 
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Normalization is not applicable to data with outliers — occasional deviations from ‘typical’ 
values. In this case normalization clusters ‘typical’ values, making them almost indistinguishable. 
The data of the Survey do not contain outliers, because the codes of answers to survey questions 
are restricted to a few given values. Continuous variables of large range are calibrated. For 
instance, income is restricted to 10 deciles. Therefore, normalization can be consistently applied.  
An alternative scaling is recommended by the OECD (OECD–JRC 2005 and European 
Commission 2002). Every variable is standardized, that is, its mean and standard deviation are 
reduced to 0 and 1. Optionally, the variable is expressed in % of the standard deviation. For this 
purpose, every variable  1 ( n x x…x′ =, ,   is transformed to  





































 The 0 value of   corresponds to the mean of the variable  y x , and 100% — to its ‘average 
deviation from the mean’.  
Unlike normalization, this method well discriminates between closely located ‘typical’ values 
even in the presence of outliers. In this case the small standard deviation factually enlarges the 
min–max range and ‘moves’ the ‘typical’ values from each other. At the same time, 
standardization relativizes ‘good’ and ‘bad’ values. Therefore standardization is adapted rather 
for benchmarking than for evaluation.  
Taking into account advantages and limitations of normalization and standardization, it makes 
sense to construct indices by both methods. Under both methods, low-level individual indices are 
summarized with or without weights. According to OECD–JRC (2005: 21), ‘most composite 
indicators rely on equal weighting, i.e., all variables are given the same weight’, and we follow 
this principle. However, standardization, changing the effective range of variables, implicitly 
introduces equalizing weights.  
Each of eight  first-level aggregate individual indices (five for flexibility types and three for 
precariousness types), called partial indices, is obtained by taking the mean of the variables from 
one of five flexibility or one of three precariousness groups of variables. Under the OECD 
method, the resulting mean is additionally standardized. The second-level aggregate indices of 
flexibility and precariousness of work are obtained from partial indices in the same way.  
The interpretation of the individual aggregate and partial indices is as follows. Under the HBS 
method, a partial index means the average (coded) response of the individual to the related 
questions. 0 and 100 are attained if all the questions are answered in the most extreme way.  
Under the OECD method, a composite indicator is a weighted sum of low-level variables, with 
the weights being inversely proportional to their standard deviations. Under multiple aggregation, 
standardization performs indirect weighting of intermediate aggregates, so that smaller partial 
indices (intermediate aggregates) can result in a greater final index, and greater partial indices — 
in a smaller final index.  
The difference between the results can be seen in Figures 1–2 with indices of flexibility and 
precariousness of work for all 31 countries constructed by the HBS method (Figure 1) and OECD 
method (Figure 2). Each country index is obtained as the national average of the corresponding 
individual indices.  
The contribution of partial indices to the aggregate indices is shown by colour bars with the 
values of partial indices given in %. The OECD method attributes unequal weights to variables 
with different range which is reflected by the size of colour bars. For example, under the HBS 
method, the contribution of externalization flexibility to the aggregate flexibility is the least. 
Under the OECD method, its role is equalized with other types of flexibility.  
The countries are ordered by the aggregate flexibility and precariousness indicated in % at the 
right-hand end of bars. Under the HBS method, the aggregate index is the mean of the partial 
indices, and it is proportional to the total length of the colour bars. Under the OECD method, the 
aggregate index is not proportional to the total length of colour bars. It is seen in the non-
monotonic decrease of the total bar length contrary to monotonically decreasing aggregate index 
— the side effect of successive standardizations.  
Due to such misleading effects, the results of the OECD method can be difficult to interpret. Still, 
we provide results obtained by both methods. 
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Figure 1. Composition of country indices normalized (HBS methodology: 0%—absolute minimum, 
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Figure 2. Composition of country indices standardized (OECD methodology: 0%—mean, 100%—
standard deviation) for flexibility and precariousness of work 
 
 
  145.  Analysis 
5.1.  Institutional and factual flexibility of work 
Figures 1–2 display indices of factual flexibility and precariousness of work in European 
countries. They show a completely different picture compared to the indicator of employment 
protection legislation (EPL) of the OECD (2004: 117, for the year 2003); see Table 1. According 
to the EPL-indicator, Turkey has the most strict employment protection legislation among all the 
OECD countries. Since the EPL-indicator is generally used to characterize the external numerical 
flexibility, Turkey would be expected at the bottom of Figures 1 and 2. However, Turkey is at the 
top, moreover, it has by far the highest external numerical flexibility (71% in Figure 1 and 356% 
in Figure 2). Figure 2 based on standardized indices additionally shows that Turkey deviates from 
the European mean 0 upwards twice as much as Lithuania deviates from it downwards (the 
closest to the European mean 0% is the United Kingdom with flexibility index of  ).   7% −
This contradiction is explained as follows. The OECD evaluation is based on institutional 
arrangements, showing that the Turkish employment protection legislation is the most rigid 
among the OECD countries. The empirical survey reveals that 302 of the sample of 454 
employees (in fact, 459 but 5 did not answer) work with no contract, meaning that 67% of all 
employees are not under labour market regulation and are working in the most flexible way. A 
similar situation is inherent in Malta, where 201 of 507 = 40% employees work with no contract, 
Cyprus (201 of 482 = 42%), and Greece (179 of 629 =28%) — another OECD country with a 
very strict employment protection, see OECD (2004: 117). All of these are displayed in Table 1. 
On the other hand, the United Kingdom with a renown relaxed employment protection legislation 
(ranked by the EPL-index of the OECD as the next to last, the last being the USA) has only 130 
of 876 (= 15%) employees with no contract. Since a relaxed employment protection is still more 
restrictive than none, the United Kingdom with the aggregate flexibility 32% (by the HBS 
method; in the estimation by the OECD method it is even below the European mean!) finds itself 
behind Turkey whose strict legislation is factually applicable to 1/3 of employees only.  
Thereby factual and institutional situations drastically differ.  
5.2.  Flexibility-security nexus in Europe 
Figures 3–4 show the location of European countries on the flexibility–precariousness coordinate 
plane. No country is located in the bottom-right corner of the plot, where high flexibility coexists 
with low precariousness or high social security. This main target of the European Commission's 
flexicurity concept looks hardly attainable in practice. The reality is still far from theoretical 
considerations. 
The regression line in Figure 3 computed by the HBS method for 31 European countries also 
shows that the precariousness of work grows as flexibility increases. The slope of the regression 
line is 28% (see the first regression equation beyond the plot). The negligible small P-value 
 excludes the null hypothesis, that the real slope of the line can be zero.   0 0034 F P =.
The regression line in Figure 4 computed by the OECD method for 31 countries has the slope 
26%, but the countries are located somewhat differently, and the P-value  .   0.1584 F P =
  15Table 1. Institutional and factual external numerical flexibility for employees in European countries / ranks 
 
  Institutional flexibility  Factual flexibility  
 Strictness  of  employment 
protection legislation          
 the opposite to the external 
numerical flexibility          
(OECD 2004, for the year 2003); 








flexibility     
(OECD method) 
Employment 
with no    
contract 
  OECD score 0–5  Normalized % Standardized %  %  
United Kingdom  0.7 / 1  27 / 6  56 / 6  15 / 6 
Ireland  1.1 / 2  33 / 5  101 / 5  25 / 5 
Switzerland  1.1 / 2  7 / 31  –77 / 30  4 / 20 
Denmark  1.4 / 3  13 / 13  –32 / 13  8 / 11 
Hungary  1.5 / 4  11 / 20  –50 / 19  4 / 18 
Poland  1.7 / 5  17 / 12  –11 / 12  6 / 13 
Czech Republic  1.9 / 6  11 / 19  –50 / 20  2 / 27 
Italy  1.9 / 6  17 / 11  –10 / 11  9 / 8 
Austria  1.9 / 6  19 / 9  2 / 9  11 / 7 
Slovakia  1.9 / 6  9 / 25  –63 / 25  2 / 29 
Finland  2.0 / 7  11 / 18  –48 / 18  3 / 24 
Netherlands  2.1 / 8  9 / 23  –60 / 23  2 / 26 
Belgium  2.2 / 9  8 / 28  –70 / 28  3 / 23 
Germany  2.2 / 9  9 / 24  –61 / 24  3 / 21 
Sweden  2.2 / 9  9 / 27  –65 / 27  1 / 30 
Norway  2.6 / 10  7 / 29  –76 / 29  3 / 22 
Greece  2.8 / 11  41 / 4  148 / 4  32 / 4 
France  3.0 / 12  12 / 16  –42 / 16  5 / 16 
Spain  3.1 / 13  22 / 7  27 / 7  9 / 10 
Portugal  3.5 / 14  20 / 8  11 / 8  9 / 9 
Turkey  3.7 / 15  71 / 1  356 / 1  67 / 1 
Estonia  –  13 / 14  –34 / 14  7 / 12 
Cyprus  –  48 / 2  199 / 2  42 / 2 
Latvia  –  10 / 21  –57 / 21  4 / 19 
Lithuania  –  13 / 15  –35 / 15  5 / 15 
Luxemburg  –  7 / 30  –78 / 31  1 / 31 
Malta  –  46 / 3  184 / 3  41 / 3 
Slovenia  –  9 / 26  –63 / 26  2 / 28 
Bulgaria  –  19 / 10  2 / 10  6 / 14 
Croatia  –  12 / 17  –45 / 17  2 / 25 
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Figure 3. Dependence between aggregated flexibility and precariousness indices normalized (HBS 
methodology) for European countries: BE—Belgium, CZ—Czech Republic, DK—Denmark, DE—
Germany, EE—Estonia, EL—Greece, ES—Spain, FR—France, IE—Ireland, IT—Italy, CY—Cyprus, 
LV—Latvia, LT—Lithuania, LU—Luxemburg, HU—Hungary, MT—Malta, NL—Netherlands, AT—
Austria, PL—Poland, PT—Portugal, SI—Slovenia, SK—Slovakia, FI—Finland, SE—Sweden, UK—
United Kingdom, BG—Bulgaria, HR—Croatia, RO—Romania, TR—Turkey, NO—Norway, CH—
Switzerland 
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Figure 4. Dependence between aggregated flexibility and precariousness indices standardized (OECD 
methodology) for European countries: BE—Belgium, CZ—Czech Republic, DK—Denmark, DE—
Germany, EE—Estonia, EL—Greece, ES—Spain, FR—France, IE—Ireland, IT—Italy, CY—Cyprus, 
LV—Latvia, LT—Lithuania, LU—Luxemburg, HU—Hungary, MT—Malta, NL—Netherlands, AT—
Austria, PL—Poland, PT—Portugal, SI—Slovenia, SK—Slovakia, FI—Finland, SE—Sweden, UK—
United Kingdom, BG—Bulgaria, HR—Croatia, RO—Romania, TR—Turkey, NO—Norway, CH—
Switzerland 
 The second regression line in both plots is fitted to 23788 individuals. It is less steep, having the 
slope 12% and 7% for the indices computed by the HBS and OECD methods, respectively (see 
the second equation over the plots). However, due to a much larger number of observations than 
for countries the P-value   is negligibly small, so that the fact of positive correlation 
between flexibility and precariousness of work is statistically certain both under HBS and OECD 
methods.  
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Thus, the regression analysis reveals a positive dependence between aggregate flexibility and 
aggregate precariousness of work all over Europe. The flexicurity domain of high flexibility and 
low precariousness is attained by no country.  
5.3.  Impact of flexibility of work on employability 
A more detailed analysis of the impact of flexibility of work on its precariousness is displayed in 
Figures 5–6, each replacing   graphs as in Figures 3–4. The first figure reflects the 
results obtained by the HBS method, and the second one — by the OECD method. Figure 7 
displays both plots together to visualize the compatibility of the results obtained by both methods. 
As one can see, both methods give similar results, so consider Figure 5 (computed by the HBS 
method). 
34 3 102 ⋅=
Figure 5 shows the regression coefficients for the dependence of partial indices of precariousness 
of work on single variables as well as on partial flexibility indices. If the dependence is 
questionable (the null hypothesis, that the coefficient is equal to 0, has probability  ) then 
the regression coefficient is printed in grey font colour.  
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The figures show the following:  
•  External numerical flexibility has a low and often statistically non-significant influence on 
all precariousness dimensions except for employment stability which precariousness 
increases as flexibility grows  
•  Internal numerical flexibility implies a somewhat precarious income but improves the 
employability which is not surprising 
•  Functional flexibility increases the aggregate precariousness, especially the 
precariousness of employability, but has a positive influence on income and employment 
stability. The relative strong correlation between flexibility and precariousness of 
employability can be explained by a reciprocal influence of precariousness of 
employability on flexible employment. One can imagine that those with low 
employability are often employed flexibly rather than normally, finding themselves in the 
vicious circle of flexible–precarious work with little chances to escape  
•  Wage flexibility has little influence on the aggregate precariousness of work, decreases 
employability, but makes some positive impact on income and employment stability  
•  Externalization flexibility improves income, does not much affect employment stability, 
and decreases employability  
The ranking and values of regression coefficients show that the impact of functional flexibility on 
precariousness of employability is by far stronger than any other interaction. The next is the 
impact of wage flexibility, again on precariousness of employability. 
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Figure 5. Regression coefficients for the dependence of aggregate indices of precarious work on low-level 
and aggregate indices of flexible work computed for 23788 individuals by the HBS method; non-significant 
deviation from zero with (P-value>0.05) is shown by grey font color 
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Figure 6. Regression coefficients for the dependence of aggregate indices of precarious work on low-level 
and aggregate indices of flexible work computed for 23788 individuals by the OECD method; non-
significant deviation from zero (P-value>0.05) is shown by grey font color 
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Figure 7. Regression coefficients for the dependence of aggregate indices of precarious work on 
low-level and aggregate indices of flexible work computed for 23788 individuals by the HBS method 
(1st bars, red for aggregate indices) and by the OECD method (2nd bars, blue for aggregate 
indices); non-significant deviation from zero with (P-value>0.05) is shown by grey font color 
 
  
5.4.  Dependence of precariousness and flexibility of work within 
European countries 
Figure 8 (four sheets) represents the values of regression coefficients for the dependence between 
first-level and second-level aggregate indices computed with the HBS method for 31 countries. 
The countries are ordered by the decreasing dependence between aggregate indices (in the top-
left plot). As one can see, the strongest dependence of precariousness of work on its flexibility is 
inherent in Norway, Germany, Poland and Croatia. The results for the indices constructed by the 
OECD method are similar, and we do not provide them here.  
Since the number of employees interviewed in each country is about 400–800, which is much 
less than the total 23788, the statistical significance of the null-hypothesis (that the regression 
coefficient is equal to 0) is no longer negligibly small. The regression coefficients which 
deviation from 0 is statistically not significant (P-value ) are printed in grey font colour.   0.05 >
Note that Turkey with highest flexibility and highest precariousness of work (Figure 1) does not 
show a statistically significant dependence between both indices. At the same time, Norway with 
a relatively low flexibility and lowest precariousness of work (Figure 1) has the strongest 
dependence between both factors. One can suppose that the flexibility–precariousness 
dependence is strong in the countries with a well regulated and little segmented labour market. 
The countries with a strict regulation but segmented labour markets (as Turkey, where 2/3 
employees work with no contract) can show no significant flexibility–precariousness dependence.  
We conclude that a high/low degree of interdependence between flexibility and precariousness of 
work within a country can be attained regardless of the level of both factors. To explain the 
degree of interdependence other conditions should be taken into account (trust in government, 
tradition, etc.). 
6.  Conclusions 
1.  Composite indices of flexibility and precariousness of work and of their aspects are 
constructed by methodologies of the Hans Böckler Foundation, and of the OECD. Both 
families of indices show that the institutional regulation of employment does not 
necessarily imply the adequate factual effect. For instance, Turkey and Greece with a 
strict employment protection legislation have in practice a high labour market flexibility 
due to a large fraction of employees who work with no contract.  
 
2.  The analysis of interaction of flexibility and precariousness indices shows that the more 
flexible employment, the more it is precarious. Employment flexibility has the strongest 
negative effect on employability.  
 
3.  It implies serious arguments against the recent reconsideration of the function of social 
security attempted by the European Commission. A shift from income security towards a 
high employability within the flexicurity strategy cannot be consistently implemented. 
Our study provides empirical evidence that a high employability can hardly attained under 
flexible employment regimes.  
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Figure 8.  Sheet A. Regression coefficients for normalized (HBS methodology) dependence of aggregate 
and partial indices of work precariousness from aggregate and partial flexibility indices by country; a non-
significant difference of the coefficient from 0 ( ) is shown by grey font color: BE—Belgium, 
CZ—Czech Republic, DK—Denmark, DE—Germany, EE—Estonia, EL—Greece, ES—Spain, FR—
France, IE—Ireland, IT—Italy, CY—Cyprus, LV—Latvia, LT—Lithuania, LU—Luxemburg, HU—
Hungary, MT—Malta, NL—Netherlands, AT—Austria, PL—Poland, PT—Portugal, SI—Slovenia, SK—
Slovakia, FI—Finland, SE—Sweden, UK—United Kingdom, BG—Bulgaria, HR—Croatia, RO—
Romania, TR—Turkey, NO—Norway, CH—Switzerland 
0 P{ } 0 05 H >.
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Figure 8.  Sheet B. Regression coefficients for normalized (HBS methodology) dependence of aggregate 
and partial indices of work precariousness from aggregate and partial flexibility indices by country 
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Figure 8.  Sheet C. Regression coefficients for normalized (HBS methodology) dependence of aggregate 
and partial indices of work precariousness from aggregate and partial flexibility indices by country 
 
  
Figure 8.  Sheet D. Regression coefficients for normalized (HBS methodology) dependence of aggregate 
and partial indices of work precariousness from aggregate and partial flexibility indices by country 
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Annex: variables used in constructing indicators of 
flexibility and precariousness of work 
The answers of individuals constitute the rows of the table numbered from 1 to 23788. The 
columns contain coded answers of individuals to the survey questions relevant to our study. The 
selected questions are grouped into three sections.  
 
Flexibility. This section includes the questions on flexibility of work grouped according to the 
OECD (1989: 13–20) classification of flexibility types (for a more refined classification see 
Keller and Seifert 2006: 237):  
 
1.  External numerical flexibility, that is, is the ease of ’hiring and firing’ which manifests 
itself in the mobility of workers between employers (external job turnover). This type 
of flexibility is reflected by the survey variables linked to the following questions: 
•  Type of contract (q3b): indefinite contract, fixed term contract, temporary agency 
work contract, or work with no contract  
•  Duration of contract, in months (q3c)  
 
2.  Internal numerical flexibility, that is, variability of standard number and of standard 
distribution of working hours. The relevant survey questions are as follows:  
•  Number of working hours per week (derivative from q15a and q15b): as one will 
or not as one will  
•  Overwork (more than 10 hours a day), in number of times a month (q14e)  
•  Number of working hours every day (q16aa): variable or constant  
•  Number of working days every week (q16ab): variable or constant  
•  Starting and finishing hours (q16ac): variable or constant  
•  Working time arrangements (q17a): set by the company, choice from several 
option, reasonable adaptability to individual wishes, or full adaptability  
•  Working time planning (q17b): on the same day, the day before, several days in 
advance, several weeks in advance, no changes of schedule  
 
3.  Functional flexibility, that is, the changeability of tasks, of teams, and of the content 
of work. It is reflected in the mobility of workers within enterprizes (internal job 
turnover). This type of flexibility is reflected by the following survey questions:  
•  Frequency of interrupting a task and switching to unforeseen tasks (q22a): very 
often, fairly often, occasionally, or never  
•  Solving unforeseen problems by oneself (q23c): yes or no  
•  Learning new things (q23f): yes or no  
•  Rotation of tasks between colleagues (q26a): yes or no    29
•  Necessity of different skills in rotating tasks (q26a1): yes or no  
•  Decision on rotation of tasks (a2a): by boss, by boss and team, or by team  
•  Necessity of further training (q27.1): yes or no  
 
4.  Wage flexibility, that is, dependence of salaries and wages on labour market or 
competitive conditions. This type of flexibility is reflected by the following survey 
questions: 
•  Dependence of work on performance targets (q21c): yes or no  
•  Basic salary (ef6a): yes or no  
•  Piece rate or productivity payment (ef6b): yes or no  
•  Other extra payments (ef6f): yes or no  
•  Payments based on the overall performance of the firm (ef6g): yes or no  
•  Payments based on the overall performance of the team/group (ef6h): yes or no  
•  Income from shares of the company (ef6i): yes or no  
 
5.  Externalization flexibility, that is, such forms as distance working, teleworking, virtual 
organisations and self-entrepreneurial activities. This type of flexibility is revealed by 
the following questions of the survey:  
•  Work with no working contract (q3b, fifth option): yes or no  
•  Teleworking from home with a PC (q11g): always, almost always, 3/4 of the 
time, half of the time, 1/4 of the time, almost never, or never  
•  Working at home excluding telework (q11h): always, almost always, 3/4 of the 
time, half of the time, 1/4 of the time, almost never, or never  
•  Working in places other than home or company, e.g. client’s premises, on the road 
(q11i): always, almost always, 3/4 of the time, half of the time, 1/4 of the time, 
almost never, or never  
•  Engagement in job(s) other than the main paid job (q9a): no, occasional, seasonal, 
regular  
•  Number of hours a week in job(s) other than the main paid job, in hours a week 
(q9b)  
 
Precariousness. According to the typology of precariousness of work given by Keller and Seifert 
(2006: 239), the relevant survey questions are classified into three groups. The fourth dimension 
of precariousness, integration in social security, cannot be characterized by the survey questions 
and is not considered.  
1.  Income which for precarious work is ceteris paribus lower than in decent work. To 
measure the income factor, the following questions are considered.  
 
•  Harmonized net monthly income, in 10 harmonized levels (ef5). The survey uses 
ten income deciles, that is, 10%-population groups for the given country; for 
details see European Foundation (2007: 96–100). Delimiters (= income figures 
which separate decile groups) used by European Commission (2005: 179ff) as 
income indices are inappropriate for our purposes, because they do not allow 
finding the average income in each group.  •  Harmonized net hourly earnings (derivative from ef5 and q8a), as the 
harmonized monthly income divided by the number of hours worked a week 
(q8a) and further divided by 4.33 weeks a month  
•  Non-harmonized net monthly income, in EUR (ef5 recalculated). For each 
country, the 10 income deciles are given by 9 income delimiters in the national 
currency (Ibid.: 100). For low-earners (1st group) the income is taken as 2/3 of the 
1st delimiter. For top-earners (10th group) it is the last (9th) delimiter enlarged by 
the distance to the next to last delimiter ( 2 = ×9th delimiter th delimiter). For all 
other groups their income is approximated by the mean of its delimiters. Finally, 
all the values are expressed in EUR rated on 1st November 2005 (recall that the 
Survey has been performed from September 19 to November 30, 2005).  
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•  Non-harmonized net hourly earnings, in EUR (derivative from ef5 recalculated 
and q8a), as the non-harmonized monthly income divided by the number of hours 
worked a week (q8a) and further divided by 4.33 weeks a month  
•  Payment comparing to payment standards (q37b): fair, rather fair, moderate, 
rather not fair, not fair  
 
2.  Employment stability, that is, the certainty of remaining at work. Among other things, 
we refer to the past practice to estimate future prospects: 
 
•  Stability at the current work, in tenure years in the company reduced to the length 
of the working life (derivative from hh2b, q2b, and q2d):  
 
Tenure in the company in years
Stability






•  Stability at the current work, in tenure years in the company reduced to the 
duration of employment after the end of full-time education (derivative from q2c, 
and q2d):  
Tenure in the company in years
Stability






•  Risk of unemployment in 6 months (q37a): very high, rather high, moderate, 
rather low, very low  
•  Uncomfortable feeling at work (q37d): very high, rather high, moderate, rather 
low, very low  
 
3.  Employability  
•  Ability to do the work after 60 (q35): yes, no will, no  
•  Career perspectives (q37c): good, rather good, modest, rather bad, bad  
•  Learning/training possibilities (q37e): good, rather good, modest, rather bad, bad  
•  Influence of work on health and safety (q32): bad influence, no influence  
 
The fourth section of Table 1, Partial indices, is reserved for five first-level aggregate flexibility 
indices (External numerical flexibility, Internal numerical flexibility, etc.) and three first-level 
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aggregate precariousness indices (Income, Employment stability, and Employability). These 
indices are obtained for every individual by the procedure described in the next section.  
The fifth section of Table 1, Aggregate indices, is reserved for second-level aggregate flexibility 
and precariousness individual indices. Their construction is also described below.    32
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